I am an associate professor at the department of Economics, Uppsala University and a research fellow at CESifo. I received my PhD from CEMFI, Madrid in 2015.
I am an applied economist, primarily working in political economy. I am also interested in labor economics and behavioural economics.
We are organizing a
Workshop in Economic History in Uppsala, May 25-26 2023!
Call for papers
Publications
Political Fragmentation and Government Stability. Evidence from Local Governments in Spain, with F. Carozzi and D. Cipullo, AEJ: Applied Economics Vol. 14, No. 2, April 2022
- show abstract - link to the published version and replication files
This paper studies how political fragmentation affects government stability. Using a
regression-discontinuity design, we show that each additional party with representation in
the local parliament increases the probability that the incumbent government is unseated
by 5 percentage points. The entry of an additional party affects stability by reducing the
probability of a single-party majority and increasing the instability of governments when
such a majority is not feasible. We interpret our results in light of a bargaining model of
coalition formation featuring government instability.
The Price of Inattention: Evidence from the Swedish Housing Market, with A. Solis,
Journal of the European Economic Association Volume 18, Issue 6, December 2020.
- show abstract
- link to the published version
Do behavioral biases affect prices in a high-stakes market? We study the role
of left-digit bias in the purchase of an apartment. Left-digit bias is the inability
to fully process digits after the first, perceiving prices just below a round number
(such as $3.99) as cheaper than their round counterpart ($4). Apartments listed
at just-below asking prices are sold at a 3-5% higher final price after an auction.
This effect appears not to be driven by differences in observables or in real estate
agents' behavior. Auctions for apartments listed just-below are more competitive
and attract more bidders and bids.
Distributive Politics inside the City? The Political Economy of Spain's Plan E, with F. Carozzi, Regional Science and Urban Economics (75), March 2019, pp. 85-106.
- show abstract
- link to the published version
- SERC working paper version (Feb. 2017)
and blog entry - Nadaegratis entry (in Spanish)
We study distributive politics inside cities by analysing how local governments allocate investment projects to voters across neighbourhoods.
In particular, we ask whether politicians use investment to target their own supporters. To this aim, we use detailed geo-located investment
data from \emph{Plan E}, a large fiscal stimulus program carried out in Spain in 2009-2011. Our main empirical strategy is based on a
close-elections regression-discontinuity design. In contrast to previous studies -- which use aggregate data at the district or municipal level --
we exploit spatial variation in both investment and voter support within municipalities and find no evidence of supporter targeting.
Complementary results indicate that voters may be responding to investment by increasing turnout.
Political budget cycles with informed voters: evidence from Italy,
The Economic Journal 128 (616), December 2018, pp. 3320-3353.
- show abstract
- link to the published version
- data and replication files
I exploit a reform that required Italian municipalities to disclose their balance sheets before elections to study whether having more informed voters affects the political budget cycle.
Municipal investment in the year before elections is 28.5% higher than in electoral years, and the reform reduced this pre-electoral spending increase by one-third.
I then study the role of local newspapers in disseminating municipal financial information to voters and find that the effect of the reform is twice as large in areas with relatively many newspaper readers,
suggesting that mayors react to more informed voters by reducing spending manipulation.
Sending the pork home:
birth town bias in transfers to Italian municipalities
, with F. Carozzi, Journal of Public Economics (134), February 2016, pp. 42-52.
- show abstract - link to the published version - data and replication files
We ask whether the birthplaces of Italian members of Parliament are favoured in the allocation of central government transfers. Using a panel of municipalities for the years between 1994 and 2006, we find that municipal governments of legislators' birth towns receive larger transfers per capita.
Exploiting variation in birthplaces induced by parliamentary turnover for estimation, we find that this effect is driven by legislators who were born in a town outside their district of election.
As a result, we argue that our findings cannot be a consequence of re-election incentives, the usual motivation for pork-barrel policies in the literature. Rather, politicians may be pursuing other personal motives. In line with this hypothesis, we find that the birth town bias essentially disappears when legislative elections are near.
We explore several possible mechanisms behind our results by matching parliamentarians to a detailed dataset on local level administrators.
Working Papers
Powers that Be? Political Alignment, Government Formation, and Government Stability, Oct. 2022, with F. Carozzi and D. Cipullo
- show abstract
We study how partisan alignment across levels of government affects coalition formation and government stability using a regression discontinuity design and a large dataset
of Spanish municipal elections. We document a positive effect of alignment on both government formation and stability. Alignment increases the probability that the most-voted
party appoints the mayor and decreases the probability that the government is unseated
during the term. Aligned parties also obtain sizeable electoral gains in the next elections
over unaligned ones. We show that these findings are not the consequence of favoritism in
the allocation of transfers towards aligned governments.
Divided government and polarization: Regression-discontinuity evidence from US states, Sept. 2022, with Maxi Sosa Andres
- show abstract
In this paper we use data on US states and a regression-discontinuity design to study
how divided government affects the polarization of the legislature, inter-branch conflict, and
policy implementation. We document that republican legislators serving under a divided
government have more conservative ideologies than those serving under a fully unified government. We find an opposite effects for Democrats. In terms of policy implementation, we
find evidence of moderation: compared to unified republican governments, divided ones with
a democratic chamber implement more liberal policies. Correspondingly, when Democrats
lose unified control, policies become more conservative.
Testing a large number
of hypotheses in approximate factor models, December 2014, with D. Amengual
- show abstract
We propose a method to test hypotheses in approximate factor models when the number of restrictions under
the null hypothesis grows with the sample size. We use a simple test statistic, based on the sums of
squared residuals of the restricted and the unrestricted versions of the model, and derive its asymptotic
distribution under different assumptions on the covariance structure of the error term. We show how to
correct the expressions for the limiting mean and variance in the presence of both serial and cross-section
correlation and provide estimators for those quantities that are easy to implement. Finally, we illustrate
the small sample performance of these testing procedures through Monte Carlo simulations and apply them to
reconsider Reis and Watson (2010)'s hypothesis of existence of a pure inflation factor in the US economy.
Work in progress
- Scars of War: the local legacy of sacrifice across generations
of British Soldiers, with F. Carozzi and E. Pinchbeck
- Marriage and labor market returns to college enrollment, with B. Ockert and A. Solis
- A Fresh Start? Understanding the Consequences of Debt
Relief, with Linna Marten
Teaching
